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INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE1 
 
The amicus is a Professor of Law who believes strongly that Section 1501 of 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §1501(b), 10106, Pub. L. No. 111-
148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) [PPACA], exceeds the bounds of Congress’s 
constitutional authority by seeking to regulate individual inactivity—the decision 
not to purchase health insurance—which far exceeds the limited enumerated 
powers granted the federal government by Article I of the Constitution.   
 
                                                            
1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(c), amicus states that 
no counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part; and that no person 
or entity, other than amicus, made a monetary contribution intended to fund the 
preparation and submission of this brief.  All parties to this dispute have consented 
to the filing of this brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
 The district court’s dismissal of this action was in error and must be 
reversed.  The primary motivation for the Constitution was the Taxing Power.   
Article I, Sections 3, 8 and 9 sharply limit that power, as does the Sixteenth 
Amendment.   
 Section 1501 of the PPACA does two separate things.  Incorporated into 
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 5000A, it: 
1. Mandates the purchase of health insurance by individuals. 
2. Attempts to enforce the mandate by imposing a “penalty” upon individuals 
who violate the Mandate.  
 
The district court’s order, which upholds both the mandate and penalty under 
the Commerce Clause, amounts to an unlimited extension of federal power to 
regulate inactivity.  In addition, it approves a virtually unlimited federal power to 
exact money from individuals, ignoring the most important limited enumerated 
power: the power to tax. 
  This Court should find the Mandate unconstitutional under the Commerce 
Clause because it forces individuals to engage in commerce, something heretofore 
never approved.  Even if this Court were to approve the Mandate, it should find the 
enforcement penalty unconstitutional as exceeding Congress’s limited power to 
exact money from individuals.  The Commerce Clause does not itself provide for 
enforcement; instead, Congress must resort to the Necessary and Proper Clause.  
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For an enforcement provision to be constitutional, it must be consistent with the 
remainder of the Constitution and must not violate other provisions – particularly 
the limited Taxing Power, the primary motivation for the Constitution. 
 The Penalty under IRC 5000A is not a duty, impost, or excise.  It is not a tax 
on income permitted by the 16th Amendment.  At best, it is an un-apportioned 
Direct Tax on individuals.  As such, it is unconstitutional. 
ARGUMENT 
 
This court faces four primary issues: 
1. Whether the Mandate violates the Commerce Clause. 
2. Whether the Enforcement Penalty violates the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
3. Whether the Enforcement Penalty violates the Taxing Power. 
4.  Whether the Anti-Injunction Act precludes this Court from declaring the  
Enforcement Penalty unconstitutional. 
 
To consider these issues, the Court should separate the Mandate from the 
Enforcement Penalty however inter-twined they may be statutorily.  IRC Section 
5000A includes both aspects of the law; however, the provisions implicate 
different constitutional provisions. 
I.  THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY 
CONGRESS’S POWERS UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE. 
Others have adequately explained how the Mandate violates the Commerce 
Clause.  This Brief will not repeat that issue other than to state the Court should 
strike the Mandate, if not the entire statute, on those grounds: the Mandate 
3 
 
unconstitutionally regulates individual inactivity, contrary to its limited power to 
regulate actual commerce.  Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 
598 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
II. THE INDIVIDUAL PENALTY IS CONTRARY TO THE 
NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE. 
 
Even if this Court were to find the Mandate consistent with the Commerce 
Clause, it must nevertheless strike the Enforcement Penalty as unconstitutional 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  U.S. Constitution Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 18. The Commerce Clause provides no enforcement mechanism; instead, 
Congress must use the Necessary and Proper Clause to enforce commercial 
regulations.  Hence, enforcement measures must be both necessary and proper.   
To be proper, an enforcement provision must be consistent with the 
remainder of the Constitution; otherwise, the power to do what is “proper”  to 
enforce one limited power could eviscerate the limited nature of other specifically 
enumerated powers granted Congress.  See, United States v. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 
1949 (2010);  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). 
Possible enforcement mechanisms are many.  For example, Congress may exercise 
limited police powers to criminalize regulated commercial behaviors.  The 
executive may seize property for public use, consistent with the Fifth Amendment 
obligation to pay just compensation.  Congress, through the executive, may use 
militia powers to force or to impede actions violative of commercial regulations.  
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Congress – generally through the executive  – may actually enter commerce by 
selling a product:  specifically, it may do so with regard to postage and impliedly, 
it may do so with other products and services, such as those involving museums, 
parks, or flood insurance.  Or, as is common, Congress may use its Spending 
Power to entice commercial behaviors deemed important.  Critical to this matter, 
Congress chose none of those other possible enforcement mechanisms; instead, 
Congress chose to levy and to collect monies from individuals who violate its 
Mandate.   Hence, whether some other form of enforcement mechanism for the 
Mandate would be constitutional as “proper” is irrelevant.  Even if this Court 
approves the Mandate under the Commerce Clause, this Court must decide the 
limits of Congress’s power to command individuals to pay money.   
Much has been written and argued regarding whether the penalty is a 
regulatory penalty or whether it is a tax.  Viewed properly, the enforcement penalty 
is subject to both sets of Constitutional limitations. The Commerce Clause is the 
only possible justification for the Mandate.  The Taxing Power authorizes no such 
broad mandates other than the filing of returns, the maintenance of records, and 
similar procedural matters related to a “levy” or “collection.”  While Congress may 
use the Taxing Power to effectuate regulatory aims, it has never used it to mandate 
specific behavior by individuals, at least not prior to IRC Section 5000A.  The 
Taxing Power is the only stated power to exact money from individuals (putting 
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aside the power to exact a criminal fine or to charge a price in the actual conduct of 
commerce by the government, issues not involved in this matter).  Hence, the 
Mandate portion of the PPPCA must satisfy the Commerce Clause and the penalty 
must satisfy the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the 
limited Taxing Power. 
Of all the Constitutional provisions, the Taxing Power was the primary goal 
of the Convention: without money, the weak government under the Articles of 
Confederation could not provide for defense, regulate commerce or do much of 
anything.  The Constitution mentions the limited Taxing Power four times (Article 
I, Section 1, Clause 3; Article I, Section 8, Clause 1; Article I, Section 9, Clause 4; 
and the Sixteenth Amendment), while it mentions the regulation of Commerce 
merely once (Article I, Section 8, Clause 3).  Indeed the Taxing Power limitations 
bracket the Commerce Clause. 
Our nation’s founders were particularly concerned about taxes.  That was a 
primary prompt for the Revolution: unfair taxes.  Central to the Constitutional 
debate was how to treat exactions of money from the people.  James Madison 
listed eleven Deficiencies of the Confederation.  James A. Madison VICES OF THE 
POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON (1787) 
(Ed. by William T. Hutchinson, et al. University of Chicago Press 1977).   First on 
his list was the lack of a Taxing Power: 
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1. Failure of the States to comply with the Constitutional requisitions. 
This evil has been so fully experienced both during the war and since the 
peace, results so naturally from the number and independent authority of the 
States and has been so uniformly exemplified in every similar Confederacy, 
that it may be considered as not less radically and permanently inherent in, than 
it is fatal to the object of, the present System. 
Similarly, Washington, LETTER, George Washington to John Jay (Aug. 1, 
1786), Jefferson, LETTER, Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington (Aug. 4, 1787), 
and Hamilton, LETTER, Alexander Hamilton to James Duane (Sept. 13, 1780), each 
described the Taxing Power as either central to the Constitution or as a defect in 
the Confederation.   And, the Supreme Court poetically described the Taxing 
Power as the most essential: “The power to tax is the one great power upon which 
the whole national fabric is based.  It is as necessary to the existence and prosperity 
of a nation as is the air he breathes to the natural man.  It is not only the power to 
destroy, but it is also the power to keep alive.” Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509 (1899).  
Because, as the Court wisely noted, the power to tax is the power to destroy, the 
Constitution sharply limits the use of the Taxing Power. 
Under Article I, Section 8, Congress can levy and collect taxes for the 
general welfare; however, the “general welfare” limitation is the least important of 
the Taxing Power limitations.  The government has incorrectly argued the phrase is 
the primary limitation.  Reply brief, Thomas More Law Center v. Obama (May 11, 
7 
 
2010, E.D. Mich.) at 27-28 (pp. 39-40 of Document 12).  Indeed, the “general 
welfare” language primarily exists to limit what Congress may do with monies 
raised: it may use them to “pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and 
general Welfare of the United States . . ..”  Grammatically, the phrase does not 
specifically limit the Taxing Power; instead, it creates and limits the Spending 
Power.  The Supreme Court explained in 1936: “The true construction undoubtedly 
is that the only thing granted is the power to tax for the purpose of providing funds 
for payment of the nation's debts and making provision for the general welfare.” 
U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 11 (1936). 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 creates and limits the Taxing Power.  Article I, 
Section 9, Clause 4 further limits the power, and the Sixteenth Amendment 
expands the power with further limitations.  Per these provisions, taxes must be 
Direct or Indirect. Indirect taxes must be uniform.  Article I, Section 8, Clause 1. 
Direct taxes must be apportioned.  Article I, Section 9, Clause 4. Congress may 
levy excises, duties, imposts, direct taxes (including Capitations) and income taxes 
on “gross income” “derived” “from” a “source,”  the last four limitations appearing 
in the Sixteenth Amendment.  These many restrictions are not trifles.  Indeed, they 
are powerful limitations on the Taxing Power. 
If Congress can evade those limitations by imposing non-criminal 
“penalties” exacting money directly from individuals, those essential limitations 
8 
 
lose all meaning.  Any exaction now considered a “tax” could be re-labeled a 
commercial regulation enforcement penalty.   Other than a capitation or other 
Direct Tax, almost all taxes involve commerce: income, transfers (such as gifts and 
descent), imports, the use of property, or the conduct of business.  The few 
exceptions involve questionable issues extraneous to this case.  E.g., IRC § 4945 
(The section imposes an excise on the political or lobbing activities of private 
foundations. While much lobbing and political activity involves commerce, 
arguably some has no impact on commerce.  Whether this and a few similar 
provisions implicate the First Amendment is a powerful issue, not relevant here).  
If a non-criminal “penalty” were exempt from the alternative requirements of 
“uniformity,” “apportionment,” or “gross income derived from a source,” those 
important words would essentially be repealed.  That cannot be the proper result 
for this important case.  How the Constitution limits criminal penalties is irrelevant 
to this matter, as the PPPCA penalty is non-criminal.  See, JCT, ‘‘Technical 
Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the ‘Reconciliation Act of 2010,’ as 
Amended, in Combination with the ‘Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,’’’ 
33 (Mar. 21, 2010), Doc 2010-6147, 2010 TNT 55-23. 
Regardless of whether the Court denominates the Enforcement Penalty a 
“penalty” or a “tax,” it must subject it to the powerful limitations imposed upon the 
levying and collection of monies from the people, in addition to whatever 
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limitations exist under the Commerce Clause.  Anything else would not be proper.  
As the Court explained in Butler, “[t]he power of taxation, which is expressly 
granted, may, of course, be adopted as a means to carry into operation another 
power also expressly granted. But resort to the taxing power to effectuate an end 
which is not legitimate, not within the scope of the Constitution, is obviously 
inadmissible.”  Butler, supra, at 18.  Similarly, resort to the Commerce Clause 
cannot be allowed to evade Taxing Power limitations. 
If “Necessary and Proper” is to mean anything at all, it must not eviscerate 
other important Constitutional limitations.  Indeed, it must not eviscerate the most 
important of all Constitutional limitations – those on the power of Congress to take 
money from the people.   As explained below, if this Court finds the “penalty” is a 
tax, it must find it unconstitutional.  Similarly, if this Court finds the “penalty” is 
merely a “penalty,” it must nevertheless find it subject to the Taxing Power 
limitations.  In either event, it must find the penalty unconstitutional. 
III. THE INDIVIDUAL PENALTY IS CONTRARY TO THE LIMITED 
TAXING POWER. 
To satisfy the limited Taxing Power, the penalty must fit one of five groups: 
1. Duty 
2. Impost  
3. Excise 
4. Direct Tax (including a Capitation) 
5. Income Tax under the 16th Amendment 
10 
 
 
A. The Constitution Does Not Allow a Sixth Type of Tax 
Although some have occasionally argued some other form of money exaction 
power exists, no one has ever discovered it, let alone explained it.  No Court has 
recognized it.  This would be a strange case to find such a power never before 
discovered in 225 years.  For a fuller discussion, see Willis & Chung, “Of 
Constitutional Decapitation and Healthcare,” 128 TAX NOTES 169 (July 12, 2010) 
(http://ssrn.com/abstract=1589190) [WILLIS & CHUNG I].  
B. The Penalty is Neither a Duty Nor an Impost 
No one claims the enforcement penalty is either a duty or an impost.  The 
issue is appropriately not before the Court. 
C. The Penalty is Not an Excise 
The enforcement penalty is not an excise, albeit listed within the traditional 
excise provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.  As the Code itself provides, the 
placement of a provision within Title 26 has no independent significance.  IRC § 
7806.  Excises apply to: 
1. The use of property 
2. Services 
3. The exercise of a privilege. 
4. The behavior of entities. 
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Never has a United States excise applied to the inactivity of an individual.  Much 
has been argued regarding whether Congress’ power to regulate commerce can 
reach inactivity.  The lower court partially finessed this issue by labeling the matter 
being regulated as involving “economic decisions” and thereby partially avoided 
the activity versus inactivity issue.  While that is incorrect Commerce Clause 
analysis, the denomination is irrelevant for purposes of analyzing the enforcement 
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause, inter-twined with the limited 
Taxing Power.  However the Court may describe the reach of the Commerce 
Clause to regulate inactivity or mere decisions, no Court or commentator has ever 
argued the power to levy an excise reaches mere economic decisions of 
individuals, let alone inaction.  Excises – particularly those on individuals - apply 
to actions – services, property use, and privilege exercises.  If this Court were to 
define inactivity by an individual as the permissible subject of a uniform excise 
tax, it would eliminate an important distinction between taxes that are required to 
be uniform and those that are required to be apportioned. The Hylton Court made 
this point, if not in the most artful manner. Hylton v. U. S., 3 U.S. 1 (3 Dall.) 171, 
176 (1796) (Patterson, J.)); see the historic discussion of excises in WILLIS & 
CHUNG I at 181-85.  Some entity excises have applied to the accumulation of 
monies.  E.g., IRC § 4943. The legitimacy of such indirect taxes is irrelevant to 
this matter, as all such examples have applied to entities rather than to individuals 
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(human beings).  Excises on humans do not apply to mere decisions not to do 
something.  If they did, they would be direct taxes, which must be apportioned.  
Apportionment is a critical limitation on Direct Taxes – a limitation which can 
indeed be failed, as it is by IRC Section 5000A.  See, Willis & Chung, “Oy Yes, the 
Healthcare Penalty is Unconstitutional,” 129 TAX NOTES 725, 727-28 (Nov. 8, 
2010) (http://ssrn.com/abstract=1703575 ) [WILLIS & CHUNG II] (discussing the 
common misunderstanding of Hylton, supra.) 
D. The Penalty is Not an Income Tax Under the 16th Amendment 
The 16th Amendment authorizes, without apportionment, a tax on “incomes, 
from whatever source derived.”  That phrase includes several limitations: 
1. The item taxed must be income. 
2. The income must be derived. 
3. It must be “from” somewhere. 
4. The somewhere must be a “source.” 
 
Many cases elucidate the meaning of these provisions.  Commissioner v. 
Indianapolis Power and Light, 493 U.S. 203 (1990); Commissioner v. Glenshaw 
Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).  
a.  The Penalty Does not Have a Proper Trigger 
Some have argued the Penalty is an income tax because it is a percentage of 
an individual’s income.  Edward D. Kleinbard, ‘‘Constitutional Kreplach,’’ 128 
TAX NOTES 755 (Aug. 16, 2010). That alone, however, does not cause IRC section 
13 
 
5000A to tax income; instead, it merely measures the amount of the penalty.  A 
proper trigger for an income tax would involve an “accession to wealth clearly 
realized over which the taxpayer has complete dominion.”  Commissioner v. 
Glenshaw Glass Co., supra at 431.  Not having health insurance is not a proper 
trigger for a taxpayer’s income from other sources.  For a fuller explanation, see, 
WILLIS & CHUNG II AT 729-30; WILLIS & CHUNG I at 286-93. 
b. The Penalty Does not Tax Income 
The government, in its brief below, spoke of cost shifting as the primary 
cause for the penalty. Reply brief, Thomas More Law Center v. Obama (filed May 
11, 2010, E.D. Mich.) at 3 (p. 15 of  Document 12).   Indeed, the shifting of costs 
from one individual to another would produce taxable wealth; however, the cost 
shifting the government decries – and the penalty attempts to reach – has not 
occurred and will not necessarily occur with regard to anyone.  It is merely 
potential.  Because it has not yet occurred, it cannot be the subject of an excise, nor 
can it be the subject of an income tax. 
If the PPACA is upheld, some individuals may indeed purchase health 
insurance with pre-existing conditions and thereby shift costs to others, or they 
may seek medical services without the ability to pay for them.  They may game the 
system and may deliberately plan to do so.   But that potential is not the proper 
subject of an excise and it does not produce any income because it is not 
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inevitable.  Some individuals will die without ever benefitting from the pre-
existing conditions provision.  Others will move to another country, and still others 
will be neglectful and never obtain care or insurance.  As the Supreme Court 
explained in Indianapolis Power, the mere possibility of an accession to wealth is 
insufficient to produce income which can be taxed under IRC section 61 (which 
follows the 16th Amendment verbatim in all important aspects).  Indianapolis 
Power, supra at 210-12 (1990).  For an item to involve “gross income,” it must be 
certain – and the alleged wealth allegedly taxed by the penalty is not.   
c. The Wealth Allegedly Taxed has not Been Derived 
Being derived is an essential aspect of income under the 16th Amendment.  
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).  Although Macomber has been severely 
limited, it nevertheless continues on this important issue.  Thus even if some 
individuals are currently wealthier because they plan to defer purchasing insurance 
until they become ill, they have nevertheless not yet “derived” that income in a 
constitutional sense.  For a fuller explanation, see WILLIS & CHUNG I at 189-91; 
WILLIS & CHUNG II at 730-31 (responding to the contrary view of Prof. Kleinbard). 
d. The Alleged Wealth Did not Derive “from” Anywhere. 
To be income constitutionally subject to tax, an item must not only amount 
to an accession to wealth which has been “derived,” but it also must have been 
derived “from” somewhere.  The mere performance of tasks for oneself – such as 
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mowing the lawn or living in one’s own home – do not derive from anywhere other 
than oneself.  They do not produce income in a constitutional sense.  Helvering v. 
Independent Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 379 (1934).  (“The rental value of the 
building used by the owner does not constitute income within the meaning of the 
Sixteenth Amendment.”) Similarly, the “economic decisions” and “self-insurance” 
spoken about in the district court are not items of income derived “from” anywhere 
but the individual’s own mind.  Such decisions are not properly the subject of an 
income tax under the 16th Amendment, just as they are not the proper subject of an 
excise. 
e. The “Source” of the Alleged Wealth is the Individual’s Own 
Personal Actions, Which is Insufficient. 
 
The “source” test essentially re-enforces the “from” test of income taxation.  To 
be “derived,” the item must come “from” a “source.”  Never has a Court approved 
an income tax on wealth produced by an individual’s decisions or actions for 
himself.  A common example is well-known to tax students:  if a person mows his 
lawn, he has no income despite having an accession to wealth, a nicer lawn.  
However, if that person mows the neighbor’s lawn in exchange for the neighbor 
mowing his lawn, they each have Glenshaw Glass income: an undeniable 
accession to wealth, clearly realized, over which the taxpayer has complete 
dominion and control.  Self-insurance – not the self-payment of expenses incurred, 
but the mere acceptance of future risks – is not the proper subject of an income tax, 
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just as it is not the proper subject of an excise.  It is simply what people do 
throughout their lives: they accept the risk of living.  At most, a tax or levy on such 
a thing is a Direct Tax on an individual.  Any other view would render the concept 
of a Direct Tax meaningless. 
E. The Penalty is Not an Apportioned Direct Tax or Capitation 
Apportionment of Direct taxes is required by both Sections 3 and 9 of Article I.  
The “penalty” is not, however, apportioned by population, as the amount paid per 
State per capita will not be the same.   Because it cannot satisfy any other of the 
limited Taxing Powers, the penalty is, at best, a Direct Tax.  Because it is not 
properly apportioned, it is unconstitutional. 
IV. THE ANTI-INJUCTION ACT DOES NOT PRECLUDE FINDING THE 
PENALTY UNCONSTITUTUIONAL 
 
The district court correctly found the Anti-Injunction Act [Act] inapplicable 
to what amounts to declaratory relief. IRC § 7421(a). Two issues regarding the Act 
are relevant: 
1. Declaratory Relief 
2. Reach of the Act. 
 
While not directly involved in this case, the Court should be aware the Act at 
most applies to persons.  Under the Act, States are not persons.  IRC § 7701(1).  
Although this particular case does not involve a State as a petitioner, the Court is 
undoubtedly aware of at least two other important cases involving relief sought by 
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States.  The Act cannot preclude the Courts in those cases from deciding in favor 
of the petitioners.  Hence, those cases will proceed, undeterred by the Act.  This 
Court should adopt the district court’s analysis of the Act in this vitally important 
matter which will inevitably move forward regardless of the Act. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, amicus respectfully requests that the Court 
reverse the judgment of the district court.  
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